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Shadow of the law in cases of avoidable harm
The law's intervention in patient safety can be haphazard and inconsistent
Liam J Donaldson professor of public health
Faculty of Epidemiology and Public Health, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, London WC1E 7HT, UK
“Jail time for a medical error.” This was the headline of Bob
Wachter’s patient safety blog about the Ohio pharmacist Eric
Cropp.1 When Cropp’s professional colleagues saw him clad in
an orange jumpsuit in a prison visiting room, they knew it could
have been them. A pharmacy technician mistakenly mixed
chemotherapy drugs with 23% saline, not 0.9%. A child died.
It was a rushed, understaffed day, with computer failures.
Cropp’s supervisory check failed to spot the error. He was
convicted of manslaughter in 2009.
A junior doctor in Nottingham, England, was jailed in 2003 for
killing a cancer patient who was given vincristine through the
wrong route. The investigator had identified some 40 systems
failures,2 yet individual accountability won the day in court. It
had happened before in the UK in similar circumstances, but
other doctors had been quietly counselled.
A look back from 2005 at the doctors charged withmanslaughter
in the UK found 85 since records began, and 38 between 1990
and 20053; there were a further 15 during 2006 to 2015.4
One of those was NHS surgeon David Sellu. On parole, part
way through a two and a half year prison sentence for
manslaughter of a patient in a private hospital, Sellu learnt on
15 November that the Court of Appeal had quashed his
conviction.5 This was because of an aspect of the legal process
in the lower court.
The chronology of events, set out in the Appeal Court’s
judgment,6 has the chilling momentum and sense of inevitability
characteristic of most patient safety narratives. It is a complex
mixture of system and human factors with elements of poor
clinical decision making. As such, there were questions of
individual accountability. These could have been properly dealt
with by local clinical governance procedures or by serious
medical regulatory scrutiny. Awful though the case was, few
doctors would say that it reached the threshold for a prosecution.
This is especially so given no apparent pattern of past poor
practice.
Should a doctor, or other health professional for that matter,
ever be charged with manslaughter? If there is no suggestion
of reckless behaviour or wilful misconduct, then treating the
failure as a crime creates a negative and punitive climate in
which the instinct for self preservation becomes stronger than
the motivation to make a report that could save lives. Good
practice in safety in healthcare and other high risk industries
points consistently to the necessity of an approach free of blame
and retribution if learning to protect future patients is to be
successful.7Understandably, many patients and families affected
by a serious incident can find this difficult to accept.
The initial legal processes that come into play in patient safety
incidents are often problematic. I once asked a group of senior
police officers why some doctors are prosecuted and others not,
in similar situations. They said that it depended whether
someone made a complaint. If they did the police were obliged
to set up an inquiry team. This police work can last years.
Healthcare organisations and the General Medical Council
cannot proceed because of the risk of contaminating evidence.
The victims get angry, suspecting a cover up. The staff member
concerned suffers enormous stress. All progress is paralysed.
Sometimes the investigation is dropped, and words such as
“exoneration” are then used, despite ongoing concerns about
safety.
In the courts, an adversarial approach is taken to establish
causation. The focus is on the accused. From the word go, the
wider systemic context hardly gets a look in. Juries have to cope
with the emotion, perhaps relating the events to their own
experience of care.
Like many past controversies involving doctors, the Sellu case
raises important questions of policy. For example: why do so
many acutely ill deteriorating patients have to die? The patient
here slid into sepsis because delayed decision making, failure
to escalate, and poor communication meant that he could not
be rescued. A third of all deaths related to patient safety in
England were found to result from mismanagement of the
deteriorating patient.8 This clear systemic vulnerability causes
major harm. The NHS shows a lamentable failure to tackle it.
Also, what can be done about private hospitals that do not have
adequate skilled cover for acutely ill patients?
The law’s interventions in the complex and subtle territory of
avoidable harm in healthcare are too often haphazard and
inconsistent. Its perspective and processes make more difficult
the task of creating a system to make care safer and inspire
health professionals to lead the way.
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